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Abstract—One source of software project challenges and failures is the systematic errors introduced by human cognitive biases.
Although extensively explored in cognitive psychology, investigations concerning cognitive biases have only recently gained popularity
in software engineering research. This paper therefore systematically maps, aggregates and synthesizes the literature on cognitive
biases in software engineering to generate a comprehensive body of knowledge, understand state of the art research and provide
guidelines for future research and practise. Focusing on bias antecedents, effects and mitigation techniques, we identified 65 articles
(published between 1990 and 2016), which investigate 37 cognitive biases. Despite strong and increasing interest, the results reveal a
scarcity of research on mitigation techniques and poor theoretical foundations in understanding and interpreting cognitive biases.
Although bias-related research has generated many new insights in the software engineering community, specific bias mitigation
techniques are still needed for software professionals to overcome the deleterious effects of cognitive biases on their work.
Index Terms—Antecedents of cognitive bias. cognitive bias. debiasing, effects of cognitive bias. software engineering, systematic
mapping.
 
1 INTRODUCTION
OGNITIVE biases are systematic deviations from op-
timal reasoning [1], [2]. In other words, they are re-
curring errors in thinking, or patterns of bad judgment
observable in different people and contexts. A well-known
example is confirmation bias—the tendency to pay more at-
tention to information that agrees with our preconceptions.
Cognitive biases help to explain many common software
engineering (SE) problems in diverse activities including
design [3], [4], [5], testing [6], [7], requirements engineering
[8], [9] and project management [10]. Research on cognitive
biases is useful not only to identify common errors, their
causes and how to avoid them in SE processes, but also for
developing better practices [7], [8], methods [11], [12] and
artifacts [3], [13].
While there is no definitive index, over 200 cognitive
biases have been identified in psychology, sociology and
management research. Some studies in the information sys-
tems (IS) community provide a general overview (e.g. [14],
[15], [16]). In their systematic literature review, Fleischmann
et al. [16] identified areas in IS where cognitive biases
have already received substantial attention (e.g. IS usage,
IS management) and areas where further investigation is
warranted (e.g. software development, application systems).
Such reviews help to synthesize and condense empirical
findings into a more communicable, cumulative body of
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knowledge. No analogous review of SE research exists. The
purpose of this study is therefore as follows:
Purpose: to review, summarize and synthesize the current
state of software engineering research involving cognitive
biases.
Here, we use current state of research to encompass not only
publication trends, publication outlets, research methods,
SE knowledge areas and prolific authors but also bias an-
tecedents, effects and mitigation approaches.
This study is timely for two reasons: 1) studies involving
different cognitive biases tend to be disconnected from one
another; 2) enough studies have now been published to fa-
cilitate substantial synthesis. This means that summarizing
and aggregating research on cognitive biases in SE can now
identify interesting patterns and produce new knowledge
by connecting previously unconnected research.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section
provides a brief primer on cognitive biases, including their
causes, effects and consequences. Section 3 describes this
study’s research questions and method; that is, systematic
mapping. We then present the findings in Section 4. Section
5 discusses the implications and limitations of our findings
and offers avenues for future research. Section 6 concludes
the paper with a summary of its contributions. Appendix
A defines all of the biases discussed in this paper while
Appendix B lists the primary studies.
2 COGNITIVE BIASES: A BRIEF PRIMER
Human behavior and cognition constitutes a critical re-
search area in SE [17], [18], [19], [20]. Many studies on
human decision-making in software engineering adopt the-
ories and concepts from psychology to address issues in,
for example, decision support systems [14], [21], software
project management [11] and software engineering and
development paradigms [22], [15], [23]. Several systematic
literature reviews have explored psychological and socio-
logical aspects of SE including motivation [24], personality
[25], organizational culture [26] and behavioral software
engineering [27]. These studies collectively indicate the im-
portance of human cognition and behavior for SE success.
While Section 4.3 provides a more comprehensive list,
some examples of how cognitive biases affect SE include:
0 Confirmation bias is implicated in the common an-
tipattern where unit tests attempt to confirm that the
code works rather than to reveal failures [28].
. Optimism bias, the tendency to produce unrealis-
tically optimistic estimates [29], contributes to all
kinds of projects (not only software projects) exceed-
ing their schedules and budgets [30], [31].
o The flaming efi‘ect—the tendency to give different re-
sponses to problems that have surface dissimilarities
but are formally identical [2]—can reduce design
creativity [3], [32].
Fleischmann [16] synthesizes a taxonomy of cognitive bi-
ases (based on previous studies [33]—[35]) comprising eight
categories. Table 1 defines each of these categories. The
categories have good face validity but it is not clear if they
are exhaustive or mutually exclusive.
Identifying causes of cognitive biases is more challeng-
ing. Since Tversky and Kahneman [36] introduced the term
in the early 1970s, a vast body of research has investigated
cognitive biases in diverse disciplines including psychology
[37], medicine [38] and management [16]. Much of this
research has focused on heuristics—sirnple, efficient rules
for making decisions and judgments. Well-known heuristics
include anchoring and adjustment (i.e., estimating a quan-
tity by adjusting from an initial starting value [39]) and
availability (i.e., estimating the importance of something
based on how easy it is to recall [40]).
Kahneman [33] went on to differentiate fast, ”system
one” thinking from slow, ”system two” thinking. System
one thinking is unconscious, effortless, intuitive, and prone
to biases. System two thinking, contrastingly, is conscious,
effortful, more insightful, more rational, more statistical and
less prone to biases.
However, cognitive biases can be generated by phe-
nomena other than system one thinking, including emotion
[41], social influences [42] and noisy information processing
[43]. The generative mechanisms for many cognitive biases
remain poorly-understood.
SE researchers are also interested in debiasing; that is,
preventing cognitive biases or mitigating their deleterious
effects [23], [44]. As Fischoff [45] explains, debiasing inter-
ventions can be divided into five levels:
To eliminate an unwanted behavior, one might use an
escalation design, with steps reflecting increasing pes-
simism about the ease of perfecting human peiformance:
(A) warning about the possibility of bias without specify-
ing its nature; (B) describing the direction (and perhaps
extent) of the bias that is typically observed; (C) providing
a dose of feedback, personalizing the implications of the
warning; (D) ofl'ering an extended program of training
withfeedback, coaching, and whatever else it takes to aford
the respondent cognitive mastery of the task. (p. 426)
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The problem with this approach is that options A, B and
C are rarely effective [46], [47], and option D can be very
expensive. Fischoff therefore offers a fifth option: debias
the task instead of the person. Planning Poker, the effort-
estimation technique used in many agile methods, illus-
trates option five—it redesigns effort estimation to prevent
developers from anchoring on the first estimate [48].
However, a specific task like effort estimation can be
corrupted by several interconnected biases [15]. Any partic-
ular redesign might not guard against all the biases in play.
Planning Poker, for instance, attempts to mitigate anchoring
bias but not optimism bias (cf. [49]).
3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHOD
This section describes our research protocol (i.e. how we
collected and analyzed data). We adopted a systematic map-
ping study (SMS) approach because we expected existing
research to be fragmented and not follow common termi-
nology or use established theoretical concepts. An SMS ap-
proach works well in such circumstances because it involves
categorizing and aggregating knowledge dispersed across
disconnected studies. This section details our approach,
which is based on established guidelines (cf. [50]—[53]).
3.1 Research questions
Based on our research purpose—to review, summarize and
synthesize the current state of software engineering research
involving cognitive biases—the research questions for this
systematic mapping study are as follows:
RQl)RQ2) What cognitive biases are investigated?What antecedents of cognitive biases are investi-
gated?
RQ3) What effects of cognitive biases are investigated?
RQ4) What debiasing approaches are investigated?
RQ5) What research methods are used?
RQ6) When were the articles published?
RQ7) Where were the articles published?
RQ8) Who is conducting the research?
RQ9) Which SWEBOK knowledge areas are targeted by
research on cognitive biases?
3.2 Protocol Overview
All of the authors planned and agreed the study protocol
Visualized in Fig. 1. It consists of the following steps.
1) Search for software AND ”cognitive bias” for all years
up to and including 2016 in the selected online
databases (see Section 3.3.1). (Retrieved 826 articles.)
2) Remove duplicates using automated then manual
de—duplication (see Section 3.4.1). (Removed 308
duplicates.)
3) Apply the inclusion and exclusion criteria described
in Section 3.4.2. (Included forty primary studies.)
4) Apply recursive backward snowballing exhaus-
tively on reference lists to find additional studies
(Section 3.5.1). (Added sixteen primary studies.)
5) Review the publication lists of the most active
authors to find additional studies (Section 3.5.2).
(Added nine primary studies.)
TABLE 1
Cognitive bias categories and descriptions (adapted from Fleischmann et al.’s [16] taxonomy)
 
Bias category Description Examples
Interest biases Biases that distort reasoning based on an ”individual’s preferences, ideas, or sympathy Confirmation bias,
for other people or arguments” [16, p. 5]. wishful thinking
Stability biases Biases that lead individuals to persevere with established or familiar options despite the Anchoring bias,
presence of superior information, arguments or conditions. default bias
Action-oriented biases Biases that lead individuals to premature decisions without considering relevant infor- Overconfidence bias,
mation or alternative courses of action. optimism bias
Pattern recognition biases Biases that lead individuals to attend more to information that is familiar. Availability bias,
fixation
Perception biases Biases that prejudice the processing of new information.
Memory biases Biases that affect recall of information or experience.
Decision biases
Social biases
relationships with, other individuals.
Biases that occur specifically during decision-making, and compromise decision quality.
Biases that prejudice judgment based on individuals’ attitudes toward, and social
Framing effect,
selective perception
Hindsight bias,
time-based bias
Hyperbolic discount-
ing, sunk cost bias
Bandwagon effect,
cultural bias
 
6) Check for sampling bias by searching for software
AND ”cognitive bias” on Google Scholar1 as de-
scribed in Section 3.5.3. (No primary studies added.)
7) Check for sampling bias by searching for software
AND [name of cognitive bias], using a list of cognitive
biases (see Section 3.5.4 for more details). (Added
one primary study for a total of 66.)
8) Assess the quality of the primary studies (see Sec-
tion 3.6). (Excluded one study for a total of 65.)
9) Extract from the primary studies the data needed to
answer the research questions (see Section 3.7).
3.3 Literature search
3.3.1 Database selection and search string formatting
We selected five online databases—IEEE Xplore, Scopus,
Web of Science, the ACM Digital Library and Science
Direct—following Dybé et a1. [54]. These databases are
frequently used to conduct secondary reviews on computer
science and SE topics, and, in our experience, provide good
coverage, filtering and export functionality. We used full-
text search (rather than limiting to title and abstract). Where
available, we used filters to avoid articles from outside SE.
To maximize coverage, we first tried the search string
software AND bias. This produced an unmanageable number
of articles (224037) including topics such as ’researcher bias’
and ’publication bias’, which are not cognitive biases. Replac-
ing ’bias’ with related terms including ’heuristics’, ’fallacies’,
and ’illusions’ similarly returned copious irrelevant results.
We therefore revised the search string to software AND
”cognitive bias”. This produced a more manageable 826
records (Table 2). All searches were completed on 20 De-
cember 2016.
Before conducting these searches, we identified ten well-
known, relevant studies based on our experience. We rea-
soned that, if any of these studies were missing from the
sample, it would suggest a problem with the search strategy.
All ten studies were found.
1. scholar.google.com
3.4 Primary study selection
3.4.1 De-duplication
We used RefWorksZ, to store and organize the retrieved
articles, and to automatically remove 239 exact duplicates.
We then exported the bibliographic entries to a spreadsheet
and manually removed 69 additional duplicates.
3.4.2 Screening
Next, we applied the following inclusion criteria.
1) The article is written in English.
2) The context of the study is software engineering:
”a systematic approach to the analysis, design, as-
sessment, implementation, test, maintenance and re-
engineering of software, that is, the application of
engineering to software” [55].
3) The article explicitly involves at least one cognitive
bias.
4) The article is published in a scholarly journal or in a
conference, workshop or symposium proceedings.
We screened the studies initially based on their titles, con-
sulting the abstract or entire text only when necessary to
reach a confident judgment.
To develop a common understanding of the topic of
study and inclusion criteria, two of the authors indepen-
dently piloted the screening process on 20 randomly se-
lected papers. This produced medium to high agreement
(Cohen’s Kappa = 0.77) [56]. Disagreements were resolved
by consensus and discussion with the rest of the team,
improving our common understanding of the inclusion
criteria. This process raised concerns regarding non-peer—
reviewed articles, academic dissertations, short papers, aca-
demic research plans, and studies where cognitive biases
were mentioned only tangentially.
We therefore devised the following exclusion criteria.
1) The article is not peer-reviewed.
2. www.refworks.com
TABLE 2
Database Search Results
 
   
 
  
     
  
  
Database Search string Filters applied Results
Scopus software AND ”cognitive bias” Included only the ’computer science’ category. 296
Science Direct software AND ”cognitive bias” Included only the ’joumals’ and ’computer science’ categories. 293
IEEE Xplore (software AND ”cognitive bias”) Included only ’conference publications’ and ’joumals & magazines’. 153
ACM Digital Library ”software” AND ”cognitive bias” Excluded ’newsletters’. 69
Web Of Science software AND ”cognitive bias” No filters were used. 15
2) The article is a doctoral/master’s dissertation or
research plan, short paper or report thereof.
3) The article’s references to cognitive biases were tan-
,,r—~\\ ffi ffl‘x fx—‘x gential to its purpose or contributions.
3’ x___._——r' x._ The third exclusion criteria was needed to exclude studies
IEEE ACM Digital Dampu Q Web Of Science that mentioned a specific bias or cognitive biases in general,
X910“?- lerar}." (295.. 309939 DWECT but did not use the concept of cognitive biases in the study.
\ 1 531 {69} J l 15‘] dads;- Some artlcles, for example, did not talk about cognitlve
./ biases at all, but the term ”cognitive bias” appeared in the
reference list. Other papers discussed cognitive biases in
their related work, but made no further use of the concept.
The same two authors applied the inclusion and (new)
exclusion criteria to another 20 randomly selected papers,
yielding high agreement (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.9). We deemed
rv/ “a .x’ ‘ r/\x ‘T
\X‘ \M l‘
Total Retrieved: 826
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Primary study selection‘3 (Included: 40)
 
""""""""""1E """""""""" ' this sufficient to proceed, and completed the remainder of
5 De-duplication: 308 '3 the screening. At the end of this stage, we had included 40
3 [Automated 239. tartanualz 69'} E Primary Studies-
+3 9*» 3.5 Ensuring sampling adequacy
This study has two basic threats to sampling adequacy:
. 1) There exist relevant articles in the population that
v f are not in our sampling frame; for example, studies
Backward snowballing ' of cognitive biases published in non-SE outlets that
 
  {Included 16:] are not indexed by the target search engines, or______________________________________________ excluded by the filters we used (see Section 3.3.1).v 2) There exist relevant articles in the sampling frame
Author's profile analysis that are not in the sample; for example, an article
(Included: 9) about confirmation bias that never uses the term
V} ”cognitive bias”.
Search executed on
Google Scholar search engine
\ 1"Included: 0‘] ,
    We took several steps to mitigate these threats, including
backward snowballing, author analysis, searching without
filters and searching specific bias names.
 
Search executed by using missing
cognitive biases from IS domain  3.5. 1 Backward snowballing
(Included: 1)
vb 
Quality assessment
[Excluded 1} 
1
Total Primary Studies
Included: 65  
Fig. 1. Primary Study Selection Process
We iteratively and exhaustively checked the references of
all included studies for additional relevant studies. That
is, each time we included a new study, we also checked
its references, leading to four iterations (Table 3) and 16
additional primary studies.
Upon closer inspection, 14 of the studies identified this
way did not use the term ”cognitive bias” anywhere in the
text, preferring the name of the individual bias. The other
two studies were published in information systems and
psychology outlets.
3.5.2 Author's analysis
Next, we reviewed the publication records of the most
prolific authors. We reviewed the Google Scholar profile and
TABLE 3
Recursive Backward Snowballing
 
Snowballing round Articles included
 
Round 1 10
Round 2 4
Round 3 1
Round 4 1
Total 16
personal website of each author of five or more primary
studies. This produced nine additional primary studies (all
of which were previously missed because they did not in-
clude the term ”cognitive bias”). Backward snowballing on
these new articles did not produce any additional primary
studies.
3.5.3 Unfiltered search
We searched Google Scholar for software AND ”cognitive
bias” with publication dates up to and including 2016. This
returned about 200 000 records. We manually screened the
first 150 results and found no new relevant studies.
3.5.4 Searching specific bias names
Ideally, we could use a comprehensive list of cognitive
biases to search each target database for specific bias names
(e.g. software AND ”framing efi‘ect”). However, with over 200
known biases and five databases, this constitutes over 1000
individual searches. Moreover, we have no credible com-
prehensive list. We therefore compared the list of cognitive
biases found in primary studies to the list in Fleischmann
et al.’s review of cognitive biases in information systems
[16], and found 18 biases investigated in IS but not in
any of the primary studies— ufler—purchase rationalization,
ambiguity efi'ect, attribution error, buse—rute fallacy, congruence
bias, consistency bias, cultural bias, emotional bias, exponential
forecast bias, input bias, irrational escalation, loss aversion bias,
mental accounting, priming eflect, reactance, selective perception,
stereotype bias and zero-risk perception.
We searched each database for each of 18 new biases
(e.g. software AND (”ambiguity efi'ect” OR ”emotional bias”
OR ) and found one new study (66 in total). Backward
snowballing on the reference list retrieved no new studies.
3.6 Quality assessment
To assess the quality of the primary studies, we synthesized
multiple recommendations [54], [57], [58] into a single set of
yes-or—no quality assessment criteria (Table 4). Since many
of these criteria only apply to empirical studies, we divided
the included studies into empirical (47) and non-empirical
(19). Here, an empirical study is simply one that analyses
primary data; non—empirical studies include both opinion
papers and wholly conceptual research. Moreover, quality
here refers to an article’s reporting practices, rather than
judging the methodological rigor of the study itself.
To improve rigor and reliability, we ran a pilot where
four authors independently assessed the quality of ten ran-
domly selected primary studies, discussed disagreements,
refined mutual understanding of the categories, and revised
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the quality assessment instrument. Then, the first two au-
thors each assessed half of the remaining studies.
The mean quality score (percentage of quality criteria
satisfied against overall quality criteria check-list) for em-
pirical studies is 84%; for non-empirical studies, 85%. We
excluded one non-empirical study that met fewer than 50%
of the quality criteria.
This brought the total to 65 primary studies: 47 empirical
and eighteen non-empirical (Table 5). See Appendix B for a
complete list.
3.7 Data extraction
Next, we extracted the data elements shown in Table 6.
We used the qualitative data analysis software NVIVO3,
because it is good for organizing, analyzing and visualizing
unstructured qualitative data, and for classifying articles
based on bibliographic information. We coded parts of
each primary study with the name of the cognitive bias
investigated, wherever an antecedent, effect or debiasing
approach is discussed. We then organized the data based on
the research questions (see Section 4). The coding schema
and classifications were thoroughly reviewed by the whole
author team.
4 RESULTS
This section addresses each research question (RQl—RQ9).
We refer to primary studies with a ’P’ (e.g. [P42]) to distin-
guish them from citations to other references (e.g. [42]).
4.1 What cognitive biases are investigated?
The primary studies investigate 37 different cognitive bi-
ases, which are listed and defined in Appendix A. Fig. 2
shows the frequency of occurrence of each cognitive bias
broken down by SE knowledge area. The most common are
anchoring bias (26), confirmation bias (23), and overconfi-
dence bias (16).
The exact number of cognitive biases investigated is
difficult to pin down because some articles use different
names for the same cognitive bias. We combined obvious
synonyms (e.g. ”optimism bias” and ”over—optimism bias”).
We did not combine closely related biases (e.g. optimism
bias and the valence effect). Section 5.2 returns to the issue
of inconsistent terminology.
To get a higher—level view of what kinds of cognitive
biases are used more or less frequently, we categorized the
biases using Fleishmann’s taxonomy [16] (Table 7). The total
number of studies in Table 7 add up to more than the num-
ber of included primary studies (i.e. 65), as some primary
studies investigate cognitive biases in multiple categories.
Two authors independently categorized the biases and
resolved disagreements through discussion. As the cate-
gories may not be mutually exclusive, we classified each
bias into the most appropriate category. Some biases (e.g.
information bias) do not fit into any category. These results
should be considered in light of mediocre 55% agreement
between judges.
3. www.qsrinternational.com
TABLE 4
Quality Assessment Checklist
 
Quality Criteria Empirical Non-empirical
Was a motivation for the study provided?
Was the aim (e.g. objectives, research goal, focus) reported?
Was the study’s context (i.e. knowledge areas) mentioned?
Does the paper position itself within existing literature?
Is relevance (to industry OR academia) discussed?
Were the findings or conclusion reported?
Was the research design or method described?
Was the sample or sampling strategy described?
Was the data collection method(s) reported?
Was the data analysis method(s) reported?
Were limitations or threats to validity described?
Was the relationship between researchers and participants mentioned?
><
><
><
><
><
><
><
><
><
><
><
><
><
><
><
><
><
><
 
TABLE5
Classification of Primary Study Based on Research Type
Type Description Primary studies Total
Empirical Articles that analyze primary data such as quan-
titative measurements, questionnaire responses,
interviews, archival data and field notes.
Non-empirical Articles that do not analyze primary data, in-
cluding not only opinion papers but also analyt-
ical, conceptual and purely theoretical research.
P1, P2, P4, P5, P6, P8, P9, P10, P11, P12, P13, P15, P16, P17, 47 (72%)
P18, P19, P24, P25, P28, P29, P31, P34, P38, P39, P40, P41,
P42, P43, P44, P46, P47, P48, P49, P50, P51, P52, P53, P54,
P55, P56, P57, P58, P59, P61, P62, P63, P65
P3, P7, P14, P20, P21, P22, P23, P26, P27, P30, P32, P33, P35, 18 (28%)
P36, P37, P45, P60, P64
TABLE 6
Data Extraction Elements
 
Element RQ Description
Cognitive bias RQ1 The bias(es) investigated or discussed in the study.
Antecedents RQ2 Causes of biases investigated or discussed in the study.
Effects RQ3 Consequences of biases investigated or discussed in the study.
Debiasing approaches RQ4 Treatments, techniques, or strategies reported to prevent biases or mitigate their effects.
Research method RQ5 The kind of study (e.g. experiment, case study).
Year RQ6 The year in which the study was published.
Source RQ7 The journal, conference or workshop where the study was published or presented.
Authors’ names RQS The authors of the study.
SE knowledge area RQ9 The knowledge area (from SWEBOK version 3) to which the study contributes.
Biases from all eight categories are investigated. The
most investigated categories are interest biases (which dis-
tort reasoning based on the individual’s interests) and sta-
bility biases (which bias reasoning in favour of current
conditions). In contrast, only two studies investigate social
biases (in which social relationships undermine judgment).
4.2 What antecedents of cognitive biases are investi-
gated?
Although the primary studies investigate 37 cognitive bi-
ases, they only consider the antecedents of eleven (Table 8).
This section discusses each in turn.
4.2.1 Anchoring and adjustment bias
Anchoring and adjustment is a common heuristic in which
one makes estimates by adjusting an initial value called an
anchor. Anchoring bias is the tendency to stick too closely
to the anchor [36].
Suppose, for example, that a team is distributed across
two separate offices. Both teams have a large whiteboard
for sprint planning. In the middle of office A’s whiteboard
it says ”What can we finish in the next two weeks?”, but
office B’s whiteboard says ”two days.” Now suppose the
team has a virtual meeting to estimate the time needed
to build a specific feature, which will take about a week.
Anchoring bias explains team members in office A giving
higher estimates than team members in office B.
Several primary studies (e.g. [P16], [P17]) suggest po-
tential antecedents of anchoring bias, including inexperi-
ence. Jain et al. suggest that experts are less susceptible to
anchoring bias than novices [P16]. Meanwhile, uncertainty,
lack of business knowledge and inflexible clients exacerbate
anchoring during decision—making in project—based organi-
zations [P63]. Other biases, including confirmation bias and
availability bias, may also promote anchoring and adjust-
ment [P17].
Anchoring bias can be confusing because Tversky and
Kahneman [36] proposed it in the context of numerical
estimates, but the term has since broadened to include
fixating on any kind of initial information. Several primary
TABLE 7
Primary studies organized into Fleischmann et al.’s [16] taxonomy
 
Bias category Cognitive biases # of Primary study ID
studies
Interest Confirmation, IKEA effect, valence effect, valid- 30 P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P10, P12, P13, P14, P16, P17, P18, P20,
ity effect, wishful thinking P21, P22, P25, P26, P27, P30, P31, P32, P36, P37, P39, P43,
P44, P49, P55, P57, P64.
Stability Anchoring and adjustment, belief perseverance, 29 P1, P2, P7, P10, P11, P16, P17, P18, P20, P21, P22, P25,
default, endowment effect, status-quo P30, P33, P34, P37, P38, P42, P43, P47, P49, P51, P53, P56,
P57, P60, P63, P64, P65.
Action-oriented (Over)confidence, impact, invincibility, miserly 22 P3, P16, P20, P21, P22, P24, P31, P37, P41, P45, P46, P48,
information processing, misleading informa— P49, P50, P51, P52, P54, P57, P58, P59, P61, P62.
tion, normalcy effect, (over)optimism
Pattern recognition Availability, mere exposure effect, fixation, Sem— 19 P7, P10, P11, P13, P16, P17, P18, P19, P22, P23, P29, P32,
melweis reflex P37, P39, P43, P60, P63, P64, P65.
Perception Attentional, contrast effect, framing effect, halo 9 P19, P20, P28, P35, P36, P40, P60, P63, P64.
effect, primacy and recency effect, selective per-
ception, semantic fallacy
Memory Hindsight, time—based bias 6 P30, P36, P49, P57, P60, P63.
Decision Hyperbolic discounting, infrastructure, neglect 3 P36, P37, P63.
of probability, sunk cost
Social Bandwagon effect 2 P21, P22.
Other Representativeness, information 9 P7, P10, P15, P29, P32, P36, P43, P53, P60.
 
studies (e.g. [P2], [P20], [P33]) use this broader meaning.
For example, one primary study found that system de-
signers anchor on preconceived ideas, reducing their explo-
ration of problems and solutions [P33]. Similarly, developers
tend to re-use existing queries rather than writing new ones,
even when the existing queries do not work in the new sit-
uation [P2]. Two primary studies ([P17], [P18]) investigated
developers insufficiently adjusting systems due to change
requests. They found that missing, weak, and neglect of
traceability knowledge leads developers to anchor on their
own understanding of the system, which causes poor ad-
justments (i.e., deficient modifications). Another study [P20]
found that decision-makers struggled to adjust to new or
changed environments because they were anchored on their
outdated understanding of a previous context.
4.2.2 Optimism bias
Optimism bias is the tendency to produce overly opti-
mistic estimates, judgments and predictions [59]. Most of
the primary studies concerning optimism bias study effort
estimation among practitioners. Several factors appear to
aggravate optimism bias.
Practitioners in technical roles (e.g. developers) appear
more optimistic than those in non-technical roles (e.g. man-
agers), at least in estimating web development tasks [P50].
The implication here is surprising: knowing more about
specific tasks can lead to less accurate effort estimates.
Meanwhile, one study of students enrolled in a software
development course found that estimates were more accu-
rate for larger tasks and in hindsight. Students are optimistic
about the accuracy of their estimates (i.e., their confidence
intervals are far too tight) and are more optimistic for more
difficult tasks and more pessimistic for easy tasks [P52].
Human perceptions and abilities also appear to affect
optimism. For example, practitioners judge more concrete,
near-future risks more accurately than more abstract, far
future risks [P24].
Optimism bias is also related to project initiation. For
example, winner’s curse is the phenomenon in which the
most competitive—not the most realistic—bid is selected
[P59].
4.2.3 Availability bias
Availability bias is the tendency for easy—to-recall informa-
tion to unduly influence preconceptions or judgments [60].
For example, availability bias manifests in two ways
when searching software documentation [P13]: (1) profes-
sionals use inappropriate keywords because they are famil-
iar and easy to remember; (2) professionals struggle to find
answers in unfamiliar locations in documentation. Never-
theless, prior knowledge has a positive overall effect on ef-
ficiency and effectiveness in documentation searches [P13].
Availability bias can also manifest in project-based or-
ganizations, when decisions are based on information that
is easy to recall or in the absence of lessons learned from
previously-completed projects [P63].
4.2.4 Confirmation bias
Confirmation bias is the tendency to pay undue attention
to sources that confirm our existing beliefs while ignoring
sources that challenge our beliefs [14]. Confirmation bias
manifests in software testing as 'positive test bias’ [61]. That
is, developers tend to test their programs with data that
is consistent with ’the way that the program is supposed
to work’, and not with any inconsistent data [P31]. Specifi-
cation completeness, domain knowledge and the presence
or absence of errors (e.g. run—time errors, logical errors,
user-interface errors) moderate this bias, but programming
expertise seems to have no effect [P31].
Another primary study suggests the presence of prior
knowledge in professionals from past projects as an an-
tecedent to confirmation bias. Professionals while seeking
information from software documentation, tend to focus
TABLE 8
Antecedents of cognitive biases
 
 
Bias Antecedents Knowledge area
Reusing previously written queries; difficult to identify referential points (anchors) [P2] Consh'uction
Missing, weak and disuse of traceability knowledge [P17], [P18] Design, Construction
Anchoring Recalling domain related information from past knowledge [P18] Consh'uction
and Not being able to adjust to the new environment [P20] Requirements
Adjustment Development experience [P16] Consh'uction
Uncertainty of future actions, lack of business / historical knowledge and inflexible clients [P63] Management
Confirmation and availability bias during design; [P17] Design
Technical roles (project manager, technology developers); effort estimation strategy [P50] Management
Task difficulty; task size [P52] Management
Optimism Esfimates asking format [P47] Management
Psychologically distant project risks [P24] Management
Winners curse in project bidding [P59] Management
Prior—knowledge; earlier experience in searching [P13] Management
Availability Lack of historical records of lessons learned [P63] Management
Selection of test—cases due to impossibility to perform exhaustive testing [P32] General
Prior—knowledge [P13] Maintenance
Confirmation Lack of training in logical reasoning and mathematical proof reading; experience and being active Testing
in a role (developer / tester) [P4]
Varied level of domain-expertise, specification completeness, presence of errors [P31] Testing
Fixation/ Framing desiderata as ”requirements” [P19] Requirements
framing
Overconfidence Inability to question the fundamental way of thinking [P45] Management
Hindsight Weak historical basis of lessons learned [P63] Management
Mere Assigning someone to a different project role, leaving one’s comfort zone, pessimism about change Management
exposure outcomes [P63]
Halo effect Subjective evaluation criteria being affected by the first impression [P63] Management
Sunk cost bias Extending decisions based on immediate benefits without considering costs of changes; stubborn— Management
ness and comfort zone characteristics of project managers [P63]
the search only on information that confirms their existing
knowledge. Prior knowledge therefore has a negative net
effect on information retrieval from software documentation
[P13].
Interestingly, professionals who were experienced but
inactive as developer/testers showed less confirmation bias
than those who were both experienced and active [P4].
Participants who have been trained in logical reasoning and
hypothesis testing skills manifested less confirmation bias
in software testing [P4].
4.2.5 Fixation and framing effect
Fixation is the tendency to focus disproportionately on
one aspect of a situation, object or event—particularly self-
imposed or imaginary barriers [15]. Only one primary
study explicitly investigated fixation; it found that framing
desiderata as ”requirements” leads to more fixation on those
desiderata than framing them as a less-structured list of
”ideas” [P19].
4.2.6 Overconfidence bias
Overconfidence bias is the tendency to overestimate one’s
skills and abilities [62]. One primary study investigates
overconfidence bias. It argues that focusing on brief tasks
might lead project managers to neglect other useful infor-
mation, leading to illusion of control and overconfidence in
their abilities [P45]. The lack of ability to reflect on one’s own
experiences might also lead to overconfidence bias among
software developers [P45].
4.2.7 Hindsight bias, mere exposure effect, halo effect and
sunk cost bias
One qualitative interview study [P63] includes numerous
participant speculations as to the causes of several biases.
To be clear, interviews do not demonstrate causal links, but
we report the speculated causes for completeness.
Hindsight bias refers to the tendency to regard the out-
come of a process as having been predictable all along, or at
least more predictable than they would have judged before
knowing the outcome [63]. The absence of archived records
from previous projects may increase hindsight bias [P63].
The mere exposure effect is the tendency to prefer the
familiar [64]. For example, project participants tend to prefer
their current role in the project [P63].
The halo effect is the tendency to use global evalua-
tions to make judgments about specific traits [65]. In a job
interview, for example, the interviewer might incorrectly
infer that more charismatic candidates are more technically
competent. Several potential antecedents for the halo effect
are suggested, including ”subjective evaluation criteria
communication problems, the focus on people faults, and
the absence of transparency in sharing personal problems”
(P- 5)-
Sunk cost bias is the tendency to irrationally invest more
resources in a situation, in which a prior investment has
been made, as compared with a similar situation in which a
prior investment has not been made [66]. Sunk cost bias may
by rooted in personality traits of project managers, including
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Fig. 2. Cognitive Biases Investigated in SE Knowledge Areas
stubbornness and myopia.
4.3 What effects of cognitive biases are investigated?
Although the primary studies investigate 37 cognitive bi-
ases, they only consider the effects of eleven (Table 9). This
section discusses each in turn.
4.3.1 Anchoring and adjustment bias
Anchoring and adjustment bias affects multiple aspects of
software development including effort estimation, imple-
menting change requests and prototyping.
In the context of artifact and query reuse, developers
who anchor on existing solutions tend to include unneces-
sary functionality. Errors in the anchors tend to propagate
into the new artifacts [P2], [P42].
Project managers often tend to anchor their initial time,
cost and effort estimates to lower values. This distorts the
assessment of software productivity, which makes it diffi-
cult to adjust project plans dynamically. For example, by
9
anchoring on a very conservative (lower) project comple-
tion time estimate, project managers tend to overestimate
software productivity. Software developers then feel pres-
sured to work harder to bring the project back on schedule.
Eventually, project managers acquire additional resources,
exceeding the project’s budget and schedule [P51].
In the context of implementing change requests, de-
velopers may anchor on their initial understanding of the
desiderata, the design artifact, or an initial solution concept.
Developers then tend to adjust these anchors insufficiently
to accommodate new or conflicting desiderata [P17].
Anchoring and adjustment bias is also observable among
students. For example, one primary study reported a pat-
tern in which graduate students simultaneously completed
courses in software architecture (in general) and service-
oriented architecture. When completing in-class assign-
ments in software architecture, the students appeared to
anchor on their concurrent study of service-oriented archi-
tecture [P64]. However, the study does not comment on
the quality of the designs or whether using service-oriented
principles was particularly inappropriate.
4.3.2 Confirmation bias
The tendency to pay more attention to information that con-
firms our beliefs affects many areas of SE. For example, due
to confirmation bias, software professionals tend to be unre-
alistically positive about the completeness and correctness
of search—queries for retrieving information from archived
software documentation. Professionals tend to only search
familiar areas of documentation, confirming their existing
Views [P13].
Confirmation bias also affects trade off studies (a practice
in which a multidisciplinary team evaluates alternative so-
lutions against multiple criteria). Participants tend to ignore
results that do not confirm their preconceived ideas [P37].
Similarly, developers tend to resist exploring major design
changes necessary for accommodating change requests that
include new or conflicting requirements [P18].
Meanwhile, confirmation bias in software testing in-
creases production defects [P4], [P6]. Confirmation bias
explains the tendency of software testers to design and run
more tests that confirm the expected execution of a program
rather than ones that could reveal the failures [P31], [P32].
During debugging, confirmation bias sometimes leads pro-
grammers to misidentify the reasons for program failure
[P32].
4.3.3 Hyperbolic discounting
Hyperbolic discounting is the tendency to prefer smaller
rewards in the near future over larger rewards later on
[67]. One primary study argues hyperbolic discounting
leads software professionals to prefer quick-fixes and simple
refactoring over better but more ambitious revisions [P36].
4.3.4 Availability bias
Software professionals tend to rely on their experience
or prior knowledge to seek information in archived soft-
ware documentation, ignoring unfamiliar and less-used
keywords and locations. Moreover, they tend to search only
those locations in documents that are either easy to remem-
ber or are readily available to them. This strategy, however,
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TABLE 9
Effects of cognitive biases
 
 
Bias Effects Knowledge area
Incorrect beliefs about the completeness and correctness of answers or solutions [P13] Maintenance
Insufficiently exploring code when dealing with a change request [P18] Construction
Rejecting results and measurements that do not support the analyst’s beliefs [P37] Design
Confirmation Higher defect rate [P4] Testing
More post—release defects [P6] Tesfing
Misidentifying causes of program failure [P32] General
Unrealistic trials of SE tools or techniques [P26] Tesfing
Runnin'g more tests that show a system works than tests that find problems [P31], [P32] Testing
Reusing SQL queries introduced errors in the new context [P2] Construction
Anchoring Design errors and adding unnecessary functionality [P42] Design
and Reduced long-term productivity [P51] Management
adjustment Ignorance change requests [P17] Construction
Inaccurate effort estimation [P64] Design
Ignoring unfamiliar and less-used keywords and locations while searchin'g documentation [P13] Maintenance
Availability Relying on memorable past experiences that are inconsistent with the current system [P17] Design
Misrepresenting code features [P32] General
Representativeness Dropping error-producing test cases [P7] Quality
Misrepresenting code features [P32] General
Overconfidence Insufficient effort in requirements analysis [P3] Requirements
Overall software development failures [P3] General
Hyperbolic Neglecting refactoring and maintenance for short-term gains [P36] Design
discounting
Framing and Reduced creativity in high—level design [P19] Requirements
fixation
Attentional Misunderstanding UM'L class diagrams [P28] Design
Miserly infor- Uncritically agreeing to a client’s requirements [P21] Requirements
mation processing
Bandwagon effect Uncritically agreeing with a team leader’s suggestions [P21] General
Status quo Illogical defense of previous decisions [P21] General
results in an inefficient search of the required information,
as individuals’ (available) experience might not always be
consistent with the current state of the software [P13], [P17].
Availability bias is associated with over-representation
of memorable code features and certain controversies such
as preferring a familiar but less suitable programming lan-
guage [P32].
4.3.5 Fixation and framing effect
The framing effect is the tendency to react differently to
situations that are fundamentally identical but presented
(i.e., "framed”) differently. One primary study argued that
framing dubious desiderata as ”requirements” leads to
undue fixation on the desiderata, consequently reducing
design creativity [P19].
4.3.6 Attentional bias
Attentional bias refers to how recurring thoughts can bias
perception [68]. For example, Siau et a1. [P28] investigated
experts’ interpretations of entity-relationship diagrams with
conflicts between their relationships and their labels. For
example, one diagram showed a parent having zero-to-
many children, when a person obviously needs at least one
child to be a parent. The experts failed to notice these con-
tradictions because they only attended to the relationships.
The paper claims that this is ”attentional bias;” however, it
does not explain what ”recurring thoughts” were involved,
or how they led to ignoring the surface semantics. Therefore,
”attentional bias” may not be the best explanation for this
phenomenon (see also Section 5.2).
4.3.7 Representativeness
Representativeness bias is the tendency to make a judgment
by fitting an object into a stereotype or model based on
very few properties [36]. Representativeness may explain
why "test cases that produce errors may be overlooked
[which] leads to an increase in software defect density” [P7,
p. 5]. Similarly, representativeness may explain why certain
”notable features of the code base are judged as frequent,
even if they are notable for reasons other than frequency”
[P32, p. 59].
4.3.8 Miserly information processing, bandwagon effect
and status quo bias
Miserly information processing is the tendency to avoid
deep or complex information processing [2]. The band-
wagon effect is ”the propensity for large numbers of in-
dividuals, in social and sometimes political situations, to
align themselves or their stated opinions with the majority
opinion as they perceive it" [39, p. 101]. Status quo bias is
the tendency to defend present conditions irrationally [69].
One primary study suggests that: (1) miserly informa-
tion processing causes professionals to accept client re-
quirements uncritically; (2) the bandwagon effect causes
professionals to accept a team leader’s decision without
considering alternatives; and (3) status quo bias leads the
same professionals to defend prior illogical choices [P21].
While plausible, we are not aware of any empirical research
that investigates these causal relationships.
4.3.9 Overconfidence bias
One primary study suggests overconfidence leads profes-
sionals to neglect requirements analysis, leading to a su-
perficial or incorrect understanding of the situation at hand
[P3]. Similarly, project managers are often overconfident in
their time and resource estimation for projects, which can
lead to outright project failure [P3]. However, myriad biases
including confirmation bias, miserly information processing
and anchoring may contribute to poor understanding of
problematic situations and poor estimation (see Section 5.2).
4.4 What debiasing approaches are investigated?
One primary study speculates that some techniques—
bumdown charts, bottom-up planning, product demonstra-
tions, daily team meetings, flexible planning, and stake-
holder feedback—may guard against numerous biases
[P63]. Others propose specific debiasing techniques (Table
10). While debiasing techniques concentrate on only six of
the 37 cognitive biases investigated, some of these may
generalize to a larger family of similar or interrelated bi-
ases. However, none of the primary studies provide strong
empirical evidence for the effectiveness of debiasing tech-
niques. All the techniques discussed in this section are
untested suggestions.
4.4.1 Availability bias
Availability bias often hinders an efficient search for knowl-
edge in software documentation (as discussed in Section
4.3.4). One primary study proposes three techniques to mit-
igate this problem: 1) developing a ”frequently asked ques-
tions" document; 2) introducing spelling conventions; and
3) using ontology-based documentation—documents that
formalize multiple relationships between discrete pieces
of scattered information, to facilitate traversal and search
[P13]. Another suggestion for mitigating availability bias
is to maintain detailed records of software practitioners’
experience gained during software project development life-
time [P53]. (This is unlikely to work because many such
documents would be overlong and go out of date quickly.)
Availability bias also affects software design. Project-
specific traceability—"a technique to describe andfollow the life
ofany conceptual or physical software artifact throughout the var-
ious phases ofsoftware development” [P17, p. 111], may not only
mitigate the effects of availability bias but also anchoring
bias and confirmation bias [P17], [P18]. Framing the project
context to highlight relevant information may also help to
mitigate availability bias during software development and
maintenance [P32].
Meanwhile, participatory decision—making and retro-
spective meetings may ameliorate the effects of availability
bias on effort estimation and decision making [P65]. Includ-
ing project stakeholders and domain experts in retrospective
meetings might further mitigate availability bias [P63].
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4.4.2 Confirmation bias
Despite being one of the most frequently investigated cog-
nitive biases, very few primary studies propose approaches
for mitigating confirmation bias. One approach to under-
mining confirmation bias during testing is to ask developers
explicitly to seek evidence of problems rather than evidence
that the system functions correctly [P32]. Similarly, asking
designers to generate and simultaneously evaluate multiple
alternative solutions should mitigate confirmation bias in
high-level design [P37]. As discussed in Section 4.4.1, trace-
ability may also reduce confirmation bias [P16].
4.4.3 Anchoring and adjustment bias
Anchoring bias is especially problematic during effort es-
timation, which is a special case of forecasting. Forecast-
ing is an area of intense study in the operations research
community; however, this review only covers SE research.
Still, forecasting can be divided into expert-based (i.e., based
on human judgment) and model-based (i.e., based on a
mathematical model). Since anchoring—and—adjustment only
occurs in expert-based forecasting, adopting model-based
forecasting can be considered a debiasing technique (with
the catch that these models are subject to statistical bias and
variance) [P53], [P63]. However, model-based forecasting
often requires information that is not available in software
projects, so several suggestions for debiasing expert-based
effort estimation have been proposed.
For example, planning poker—an estimation technique
where participants independently estimate tasks and simul-
taneously reveal their estimates, was proposed to prevent
anchoring on the first estimate [P38]. Analogously, generat-
ing multiple design candidates may help avoid anchoring
on a preconceived solution [P33]. However, the research on
group estimation from multiple anchors is mixed (cf. [70] for
a summary), and we are not aware of any research investi-
gating how multiple design candidates affect anchoring.
Some primary studies argue that anchoring on an initial
estimate can be mitigated by explicitly questioning software
project managers via different facilitators (project members
or stakeholders). The resulting knowledge sharing should
help project managers avoid anchoring their initial estimates
on prior experience or self—assessments [P65], [P63].
One study [P37] suggested raising awareness about an-
choring bias. While such weak interventions are unlikely to
help [45], asking directed questions (discussed next) may be
more effective [P3].
4.4.4 Overconfidence and optimism bias
Overconfidence and optimism are two of the most in-
vestigated cognitive biases in the SE literature (see Fig.
2). Browne and Ramesh [P3] propose addressing several
cognitive biases, including overconfidence, using directed
questions, which ”attempt to elicit information through the
use of schemes or checklists designed to cue information
in the user’s memory.” For instance, to reduce anchoring
(discussed above) we might ask, ”What is your starting
point for estimating (that) duration? Why did you start
there?”). To reduce overconfidence, we might ask, ”Play the
devil’s advocate for a minute; can you think of any reasons
why your solution may be wrong?” [P3].
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TABLE 10
Debiasing techniques
 
 
Bias Debiasing technique Knowledge area
Traceability [P17], [P18] Design, Construction
Directed questions [P3] Requirements
Anchoring Planning poker [P38] Management
and Generating multiple solutions [P33] Design
adjustment Increasing awareness of the bias, warning participants, disregarding initial anchors or status Design
quo [P37]
Statistical prediction methods [P53] Process
Technical competence and explicit questioning by facilitators [P65] Management
Appropriate documentation [P13] Management
Traceability [P17], [P16] Design, Construction
Availability Framing information to highlight problematic areas [P32] General
Maintaining detailed records [P53] Process
Participatory retrospective decision-making meetings [P65] Management
Stakeholder feedback and expert involvement [P63] Management
Overoptimism Directed questions [P3] Requirements
and Planning poker [P62] Management
overconfidence Double—loop learning [P45] Management
Appropriately framing estimation questions [P47] Management
Traceability [P16] Construction
Confirmation Explicitly exploring disconfirmatory evidence [P32] General
Generating multiple solutions [P37] Design
Representativeness Training, retrospectives, warning about biases, and explicitly asking for alternate solutions Process[P53]
Maintaining a consistent user interface [P20] Requirements
Another primary study argues that Planning Poker helps
practitioners mitigate optimism [P62]. However, planning
poker does not explicitly encourage converging on more
realistic (or pessimistic) estimates. It seems more plausible
that the range of estimates would mitigate overconfidence.
Another technique for mitigating overconfidence bias
is double-loop learning [P45]. This involves encouraging in-
dividuals and organizations to engage in self—reflective
learning by explicitly confronting initial assumptions and
developing more appropriate ones.
Meanwhile, one primary study found that the framing of
estimation questions affects optimism. Specifically, asking
”How much effort is required to complete X?” provided
less optimistic estimates than asking, ”How much can be
completed in Y work hours?” [P47]. Focusing on tasks
(rather than time periods) could therefore be considered a
debiasing technique.
4.4.5 Representativeness
Several non-evaluated techniques for mitigating the effects
of representativeness are proposed, as follows:
. Using consistent user interfaces in decision support
systems [P20].
o Explicitly asking practitioners for alternative solu-
tions (or ideas) [P53].
o Encouraging retrospective analysis and assessment
of practitioners’ judgments [P53].
0 Warning practitioners about the bias a priori (which,
again, is unlikely to work) [P53].
0 Frequently training the participants to avoid repre-
sentativeness [P53].
TABLE 11
Frequently Used Research Methods
 
Research method
Experiment
Case study
Think-aloud protocol analysis
Interview
Grounded theory
Survey
Other approaches
# Primary studies
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4.5 What research methods are used?
Table 11 summarizes research methods used most fre-
quently to investigate cognitive biases in SE. Most of the em-
pirical studies employed laboratory experiments. Predom-
inately qualitative research approaches (e.g. case studies)
are underrepresented. Nine empirical papers reported mul-
tiple studies, of which seven reported multiple experiments
while two adopted a multimethodological approach.
Other approaches include studies that either used preex-
isting data sets (e.g. archived data from company records or
project documents) or did not report sufficient details about
the research method to classify.
4.6 When were the articles published?
Fig. 3 shows the number of primary studies published each
year. The earliest paper published was in 1990. There were
one or two papers per year until 2001, after which we see
a noticeable but inconsistent increase, peaking in 2010. The
spike seen in 2010 is mostly due to four publications co-
authored by Calikli and Bener, who feature in the list of
most prolific authors (Section 4.8). Only two of studies were
12
10
Nu
mb
er
of
Pr
im
ar
y
St
ud
ie
s
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Years
Fig. 3. Publication Trend until 2016
found in 2016. There could be additional 2016 studies that
were not indexed at the time of the search (in December,
2016).
4.7 Where were the articles published?
Table 12 shows the most common publication outlets. Arti-
cles are scattered across many outlets, with 58% in journals
or academic magazines, and the rest in conferences, work-
shops or symposiums. The outlet with the most articles (5)
is Journal of Systems and Software.
4.8 Who is conducting the research?
To investigate the most prolific authors, we ranked all 109
authors by the number of publications in the sample. Of
these, 81 authors had one paper; 16 authors had two papers;
and eight authors had three papers. Four authors stand
out with five or more primary studies (Table 13). Magne
Jorgensen is clearly the most prolific author working in
this area. Some of the authors that feature in the table are
frequent collaborators; for instance, Calikli and Bener co-
authored eight publications, while Jargensen and Molokken
collaborated on four.
4.9 Which SWEBOK knowledge areas are targeted by
research on cognitive biases?
To answer RQ9, we categorized the primary studies using
the knowledge areas specified in the Software Engineering
Body Of Knowledge [71], as shown in Table 14. The most
frequently investigated knowledge area is SE management
in 21 primary studies, followed by software construction
and software design investigated in 12 and 11 primary
studies respectively. Many critical knowledge areas includ-
ing requirements, design, testing and quality are under-
represented.
5 DISCUSSION
This section summarizes the implications of this study for
SE research, practice and education, followed by its limita-
tions and avenues for future research.
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5.1 Implications for SE research
The results of this study suggest four ways of improv-
ing research on cognitive biases in SE: conducting more
qualitative and multimethodological research; investigating
neglected areas; better integrating results across studies; and
addressing confusion.
First, experiments are clearly the preferred method in
our sample (see Section 4.5). This is appropriate insofar as
48 of the primary studies investigate causality, rather than
establish facts or develop theories. However, it is crucial to
understand not only whether but also how, and how much
cognitive biases affect productivity, quality, and software
engineering success [72]. Demonstrating a bias in a lab is not
the same as establishing a significant effect on real projects.
Some biases (e.g. fixation) may completely derail projects
(e.g. through complete failure to innovate) while others may
have measurable but practically insignificant effects. Mea-
suring effects on specific dependent variables is essential
for differentiating high-impact biases from low-impact ones.
Additionally, better understanding the mechanisms through
which biases sabotage success will help us create effective
debiasing practices.
More qualitative and exploratory research is needed
to understand where and how cognitive biases manifest
in SE practice, and how biases and debiasing techniques
are perceived by practitioners. Multimethodological ap-
proaches may also help. For example, combining a ran-
domized control trial with a protocol study [73] may help
not only demonstrate a causal relationship (experiment) but
also reveal the cognitive mechanism underlying the causal
relationship (protocol analysis).
Second, many cognitive biases have been investigated
in information systems but not software engineering (e.g.
ambiguity effect, emotional bias, irrational escalation, re-
actance, Dunning—Kruger effect [16]). It is plausible that
all these biases, and more besides, also affect SE projects.
For instance, the Dunning—Kruger effect—the tendency for
less skilled people to overestimate their abilities [74]—could
explain some conflicts between professionals with different
skill levels.
Furthermore, several categories of biases (e.g. social and
memory biases) are largely ignored in the SE literature.
Similarly, cognitive biases have not been applied to several
SE knowledge areas, including configuration management
and professionalism (see Table 14). Meanwhile, 21 of the
cognitive biases reviewed here were investigated by only
one or two studies. Most of the primary studies simply
demonstrate biases; few propose debiasing techniques (e.g.
[P18], [P45]), which are crucial for practical impact.
Third, research on cognitive biases in SE suffers from
the same problems as research on cognitive biases in psy-
chology: most studies investigating or discussing the same
phenomenon are disconnected from each other (see Section
5.5). Cognitive phenomena rarely act in isolation. Better
integrating across studies, biases and knowledge areas may
be necessary to understand complex cognitive explanations
for routine SE problems. For example, design creativity
is inhibited by the nexus of framing effects, fixation and
requirements engineering practices [3].
Fourth, research on cognitive biases in SE (and to a lesser
TABLE 12
Publication Outlets
 
Source Avenue # Primary Studies
Journal of Systems and Software
Journal of Software
Systems Engineering ConferenceInternational Conference on Software Engineering
Information and Software Technology Journal
Empirical Software Engineering Journal
International Conference on Evaluation and Assessment in Software EngineeringIEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Communications of the ACM
Information Systems Journal
International Conference on Information SystemsInternational Conference on Predictive Models in Software Engineering
International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and MeasurementPsychology of Programming Interest Group Workshop
Information 8: Management Journal
Advanced information systems engineering Journal
International Journal of Project Management
European Conference on Cognitive Science
AI Magazine
Americas Conference on Information Systems
Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer EngineeringDocument Engineering (Symposium)
European Conference on Information Systems
European Software Process Improvement
IASTED International Conference on Software Engineering
Information Systems Management Journal
Information Systems Research Journal
International Conference on Electronics, Communications and Computers
International Conference on Information Science and Technology
International Conference on Information, Business and Education Technology
International Conference on Intelligent user interfaces
International Workshop on Emerging Trends in Software Metrics
Journal of Association for Information Systems
Journal of Visual Languages
Management Science JournalProceedings of AGILE conference
Research in Systems Analysis and Design: Models and Methods JournalScandinavian Journal of Information Systems
Science of Computer Programming Journal
Software Quality Journal
Transaction on Professional Communication Journal
Ubiquity Journal
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TABLE 13
Cognitive biases investigated by top SE researchers
Researcher # Primary Cognitive biases investigated Knowledge area
studies
Jelrgensen 13 Optimism, confidence, anchoring and adjustment, hindsight, wishful Management, construction,
thinking, impact, selective perception, representativeness, availability, generalmisleading information
Bener 8 Confirmation, representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjust- Construction,testing
ment
Calikli 8 Confirmation, representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjust- Construction,testing
ment
Molekken 5 Confidence, anchoring and adjustment, optimism Management, construction,
general
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TABLE 14
SE Knowledge Areas Investigated
 
Knowledge area # Primary studies
SE Management 21
Software Construction 12
Software Design 11
Software Requirements
Software Testing
SE (General)
Software Quality
Software Maintenance
SE Process
SE Models 81: MethodsEngineering Foundations
Software Configuration Management
SE Economics
SE Mathematical Foundations
SE Professionalism OO
OO
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extent in cognitive psychology) suffers from widespread
confusion, which we address in the next subsection.
5.2 Widespread confusion
Analyzing many of the primary studies was hindered by
several interconnected problems.
Some biases are defined inconsistently between studies.
Some biases have multiple names (e.g. system justification
is the same as status-quo bias). Some ostensibly different
biases are extremely similar, or likely just the same underly-
ing cognitive process manifesting in different circumstances.
For example, when we get preoccupied with a number, it is
called anchoring bias [22]. But when we get preoccupied with
a default option, it is called default bias [69]. We call preoccu-
pation with presentation theframing efi‘ect [2]. Preoccupation
with information that supports our beliefs is confirmation
bias [75], while preoccupation with the typical use of an
object isfunctionalfixedness [76]. Preoccupation with the first
few items in a list is primacy, while preoccupation with
current conditions is status quo bias. If we better understood
attention and perception, we might not need all these terms
to explain what people attend to.
Meanwhile, the primary studies reviewed here attempt
to apply concepts from a social science discipline to an
applied science context, which is often quite different from
the context in which those concepts originated. Communica-
tion across scientific communities can be difficult, and some
miscommunication is normal [77].
These problems lead to several points of confusion:
1) Dubious causal relationships between biases. For
instance, arguing that framing causes fixation [3] is
questionable because both the ’cause’ and 'effect’
may be the same phenomenon in different guises.
One primary study addressed this by organizing
similar biases into ”biasplexes” [P22] to help reason
about debiasing.
2) Confusing biases with heuristics and fallacies. Cog-
nitive biases are patterns of errors. Heuristics are
simple but imperfect rules for judging and deciding
[36]. Heuristics like anchoring—and—adjustment cause
biases like adjustment bias when the heuristic leads
to a pattern of errors under certain circumstances.
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Meanwhile, fallacies are specific errors in logic [78].
For example, the sunk cost fallacy is a logical error
in which past (lost) investment is used to justify
further (irrational) investment [79]. Some cognitive
biases (e.g. sunk cost bias) are basically the tendency
for different people to make the same logical fallacy
under similar circumstances.
3) Some articles simply use terms incorrectly. For in-
stance, one article claimed that the ”Parkinson’s
Law Effect’ is a cognitive bias; specifically, the ten-
dency to procrastinate until the day a task is due. As
far as we can tell, there is no such effect. Parkinson’s
Law, which is not a cognitive bias, claims that ”work
expands so as to fill the time available for its com-
pletion.” [80]. It means that people keep working
on things until they are due, not that they wait
until the due date to start. Other articles seemed
to misunderstand attentional bias, confirmation bias
and many others.
To address these areas of confusion, we offer suggestions
to both researchers and editors. For researchers, applying
theories from reference disciplines to new contexts is often
difficult. Skimming a single article or Wikipedia entry is not
sufficient to understand a cognitive bias or psychological
theory. Depending on the theory and researcher, it may
be necessary to take courses in cognitive psychology or
conduct an extensive literature review. Finding a mentor
or collaborator with a strong background in the bias or
theory is also wise. (We discussed aspects of this paper
with three different professors of psychology to make sure
that our interpretations are reasonable and our nomencla-
ture correct). Meanwhile, editors faced with a manuscript
applying a theory from a reference discipline to SE should
consider inviting a review from someone with a strong
background in that theory or reference discipline, even if
they are in another discipline. This practice can be modeled
after statistical review in medical journals (cf. [81]).
5.3 Implications for SE practice
The most important takeaways of this research for practi-
tioners are as follows:
1) Cognitive biases are universal human phenomena.
They affect everyone and likely disrupt all aspects
of software development, regardless of industry,
platform, programming language or project man-
agement philosophy.
2) Tasks are often easier to debias than people [45].
Although, awareness can help people avoid situa-
tions in which the biases arise [82], many debiasing
practices can mitigate biases quickly and econom-
ically. Learning to perceive and resist anchoring
and adjustment is difficult. Planning poker is easy.
Learning to write judicious unit tests takes years,
but having a whole team spend a day trying to break
a system to win a gift basket works instantly. Trying
to teach a product designer to be more creative is
daunting, but a team can run through a series of
lateral thinking exercises in an afternoon.
3) None of the research reviewed here provides com-
pelling empirical evidence that any specific debias-
ing approach will be effective in a specific future
project. Debiasing techniques may have unintended
consequences. Caution is warranted.
Some debiasing techniques that have been proposed for
software engineering contexts, but have not been exten-
sively validated, include:
1) Planning poker to prevent anchoring bias in effort
estimation [P38].
2) Reference class forecasting or model-based forecast-
ing to mitigate optimism in effort estimation [P45].
3) Ontology—based documentation to mitigate avail-
ability bias [P13].
4) Directly asking for disconfirmatory evidence to re-
duce confirmation bias [P32].
5) Generating multiple, diverse problem formulations
and solution candidates to mitigate framing effects
[P53].
6) Using confirmation bias metrics to select less—biased
testers [P6].
7) For security, employing independent penetration
testing specialists to reduce confirmation bias [83].
8) Designating a devil’s advocate in retrospective
meetings to avoid groupthink [84].
5.4 Implications for SE education
Reasoning can be debiased through extensive training [45].
What would constitute extensive training varies depending
on the bias.
For example, extensive training in effort estimation
might consist of estimating thousands of user stories, with
immediate and unambiguous feedback. This is probably im-
practical, especially considering the great variety of software
projects and the domain knowledge necessary to estimate
tasks accurately.
In contrast, extensive training in design creativity might
be more practical. For example, consider an assignment
where students have to design a suitable architecture for
a given teaching case using UML. Now suppose students
are instead asked to design four alternative architectures,
all of which should be reasonable and quite different from
each other. Or, suppose students are asked to design just
two architectures, one uncontroversial and one radical. If
most design—related assignments throughout their degrees
call for multiple alternatives, generating several design can-
didates will seem natural. Students are thus more likely to
carry this practice into their professional work, much like
the programming styles and testing practices taught today.
Implementing all the alternatives is unnecessary.
Whether and how to teach the theory of cognitive biases
or particular debiasing techniques is another matter. Rather
than teaching it as a stand-alone topic, it may be more
efficient to explain many cognitive biases in the context of
common problems and practices.
For example, a common topic in software project man-
agement courses is effort estimation. The instructor shares
empirical research on poor effort estimation and the damage
it can cause, and explains how Scrum and Extreme Pro-
gramming prescribe planning poker. The students might
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then do a planning poker exercise on their term project.
This presents planning poker through a method lens. In
contrast, the instructor can present it through a theory lens.
First, we explain the problem (which is readily understood),
followed by the key causes of the problem: 1) anchoring
bias; 2) optimism bias; 3) pressure from management and
stakeholders to deliver faster. Then, we describe specific de-
biasing techniques: planning poker for anchoring bias and
reference class forecasting for optimism bias. This approach
gives students a more nuanced, evidence-based conception
of both the problem and potential solutions.
5.5 Limitations
The findings of this research should be considered in light
of several limitations.
The concept of cognitive biases is not without problems:
”the explanations of phenomena via one-word labels such
as availability, anchoring, and representativeness are vague,
insufficient, and say nothing about the processes underlying
judgment” [85, p. 609]. Most cognitive biases ”have been
studied in complete isolation without any reference to the
other ones thus resembl[ing] an archipelago spread out
in a vast ocean without any sailor having Visited more than
one (or at the most two) of the small islands yet.” [86, p. 399].
Cognitive biases do not constitute a comprehensive theory
of reasoning; they are more like a set of empirical generaliza-
tions regarding common reasoning problems. Except, many
of the problems seem related, and both their relationships
and causes are mysterious. Synthesizing research based on
cognitive biases is therefore epistemologically fraught.
Furthermore, inconsistent terminology in the primary
studies, as discussed in Section 5.2, impedes analysis. The
analyst must constantly question whether what is said is
what is meant. This extra layer of interpretation creates
additional possibilities for errors.
Our search string may have missed relevant studies pub-
lished in computer science outlets. Further relevant studies
may not be indexed by the databases we searched. Limit-
ing our search to ’computer science’ or similar categories
(see Table 2) may have excluded relevant studies in other
domains (e.g. a study of a cognitive bias in an SE context
published in a psychology journal). ’ We used several tactics
to improve external validity, as explained in Section 3.5):
1) we employed backward snowballing on reference
lists of primary studies;
2) we analyzed the profiles of most prolific authors to
check if we have missed any relevant studies;
3) being well versed with this topic, we discussed as
a group whether we knew of any relevant studies
that were suspiciously absent from sample;
4) we analyzed the first 150 results of the same search
on Google Scholar;
5) we searched the for the names of some specific
cognitive biases.
Despite these precautions, however, some relevant studies
may still have been missed. In particular, because we ex-
cluded unpublished works; the results are subject to publi-
cation bias.
5.6 Future research
The research reviewed here does not support many con-
crete, practical recommendations for overcoming cognitive
biases in real software projects. Better recommendations will
require several parallel lines of inquiry:
1) understanding the social and cognitive processes (in
software development) from which cognitive biases
emerge;
2) measuring the effects of specific biases in specific
contexts to see what’s practically important;
3) adapting existing debiasing approaches for software
engineering contexts, and developing new ones;
4) empirically evaluating the effectiveness of debiasing
techniques.
Each of these lines of inquiry require different kinds
of studies. Qualitative studies, including case studies [87],
grounded theory [88] and protocol studies [89], [90] are
well suited to understanding social and cognitive processes.
Meanwhile, because software engineering success is so mul-
tifaceted [91], sophisticated statistical modelling is needed to
estimate the effects of a specific bias. Creating new debiasing
approaches and adapting existing ones for software contexts
is engineering research in the sense that the research seeks to
invent a useful artifact. The debiasing artifacts can be eval-
uated using controlled experiments [92] or action research
[93].
Meanwhile, we need a better classification of cognitive
biases. We found that some biases are difficult to classify in
Fleischmann et al.’s [16] taxonomy—some appear related
to multiple categories; others do not fit in any category
(Section 4.1). Better organizing cognitive biases according to
their causal mechanisms, the nature of their effects or their
specific manifestations in software projects would facilitate
reasoning about biases and possibly inform debiasing tech-
niques.
6 CONCLUSION
This study provides a comprehensive view of research on
cognitive biases in software engineering. It identifies 65
primary studies exploring 37 cognitive biases, organized
into eight categories. The most investigated cognitive biases
belong to interest and stability biases, whereas, the class of
social and decision biases are least investigated. A constant
and sustained interest in this area is clear, especially in
software project management. Substantial opportunities for
impactful research remain not only in other areas (e.g. de-
sign, testing, and devops) but also considering other biases
(e.g. selective perception, input bias and priming effect).
Some of the key findings of this paper are:
c SE research focuses on multiple antecedents and
effects of cognitive biases; however, the psycholog-
ical and sociological mechanisms underlying many
cognitive biases are poorly understood.
0 We found debiasing approaches for only six cogni-
tive biases. None were empirically evaluated and few
were grounded in psychological theory.
I Controlled experiments are the most common re-
search method for investigating cognitive biases in
17
SE. However, we found no replications, families of
experiments or meta-analyses.
0 Most of the primary studies are disconnected. That
is, many studies do not refer to previous SE research
on the same bias, or conceptualize the bias in the
same way.
In summary, cognitive biases help to explain many com-
mon problems in SE. While they are robust against sirn-
ply raising awareness, professionals can often be debiased
through simple interventions. The better we understand the
theoretical foundations of common problems and practices,
the easier it will be to develop effective interventions to
mitigate biases and therefore alleviate their corresponding
problems. Ultimately, we hope that this literature review
will encourage many SE researchers to further explore the
phenomena of cognitive biases in SE and thus will serve as
a basis for future research.
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Cognitive bias Category Definition Primary studies
Anchoring and ad- Stability "The tendency, in formm'g perceptions or making quantitative judg— P1, P2, P7, P10, P11, P16,
justment bias ments of some entity under conditions of uncertainty, to give excessive P17, P18, P20, P22, P30, P33,
weight to the initial starting value (or anchor), based on the first received P34, P37, P38, P42, P43, P47,
information or one’s initial judgment, and not to modify this anchor P49, P51, P53, P56, P57, P60,
sufficiently in light of later information” [39, p. 51]. Adjustment bias is a P63, P64, P65
psychological tendency that influences the way people intuitively assess
probabilities [36].
Attentional bias Perception The tendency of our perception to be affected by our recurring thoughts P28, P40
[68].
Availability bias Pattern- Availability bias refers to a tendency of being influenced by the informa- P7, P10, P11, P13, P16, P17,
recognition tion that is easy to recall and by the information that is recent or widely P18, P23, P29, P32, P37, P39,
publicized [40]. P43, P60, P63, P64, P65
Bandwagon effect Social ”The tendency for large numbers of individuals, in social and sometimes P21, P22
political situations, to align themselves or their stated opinions with the
majority opinion as they perceive it” [39, p. 101].
Belief perseverance Stability ”The tendency to maintain a belief even after the information that P22
originally gave rise to it has been refuted or otherwise shown to be
inaccurate” [39, p. 112].
(Over) confidence Action— The tendency to overestimate one’s own skill, accuracy and control over P3, P16, P20, P37, P41, P45
bias oriented one’s self and environment [62].
Confirmation bias Interest The tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and remember informa- P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10,
tion in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions [94]. P12, P13, P14, P16, P17, P18,
P20, P21, P26, P27, P30, P31,P32, P36, P37, P39, P43, P44,
P55, P64
Contrast effect Perception The enhancement or reduction of a certain perception’s stimuli when P36
compared with a recently observed, contrasting object [95].
Default bias Stability The tendency to choose preselected options over superior, unselected P22
options [69].
Endowment effect Stability ”The tendency to demand much more to give up an object than one is P25
willing to pay to acquire it” [96]; i.e., when someone values something
more just because they own it.
Fixation Pattern- The tendency to disproportionately focus on one aspect of an event, P19
recognition object, or situation, especially self-imposed or imagmary' obstacles [97].
Framing effect Perception ”The tendency to give different responses to problems that have surface P19, P20, P64
dissimilarities but that are really formally identical” [2]
Halo effect Perception The halo effect can be defined as the tendency to use global evaluations P35, P63
to make judgments about specific traits [65].
Hindsight bias Memory When people know the actual outcome of a process, they tend to regard P49, P57, P60, P63
that outcome as having been fairly predictable all along—or at least
more predictable than they would have judged before knowing the
outcome [63].
Hyperbolic Decision The tendency of people to prefer options that offer smaller rewards with P36
discounting more immediate pay—off to options with larger rewards promised for
future [67].
IKEA effect / I- Interest The tendency for people to ascribe greater value to items that they have P25
designed—it—myself created, designed or assembled [62].
effect
Impact bias Action- Impact bias is the tendency for people to overestimate the length or the P49, P57
oriented intensity of future feeling states [98].
Information bias Other The tendency to request unnecessary or unhelpful information, espe- P10, P15, P36
cially in times of uncertainty [66].
Infrastructure bias Decision The location and availability of preexisting infrastructure such as roads P37
and telecommunication facilities influences future economic and social
development [99].
Invincibih'ty bias Action— The tendency to over trust one’s own abilities [99]. P37
oriented
Mere exposure ef- Pattern ”Increased liking for a stimulus that follows repeated, unreinforced P22, P63, P65
fect recognition exposure to that stimulus" [100, p. 31].
Miserly informa- Action- The tendency to avoid deep or complex information processing [2]. P21
tion processing oriented
Misleading
information
Neglect of probabil-ity
Normalcy effects
(Over)
bias
optimism
Primacy and
recency effects
Representativeness
Selective perception
Semantic fallacy
Semmelweis reflex
Status-quo bias /
System justification
Sunk cost bias
TiIne-based bias
Valence effect
Validity effect
Wishful thinking
Action-
oriented
Decision
Action-
oriented
Action-
oriented
Perception
Other
Perception
Perception
Pattern
recognition
Stability
Decision
Memory
Interest
Interest
Interest
The tendency to blindly follow provided information without being able
to self-evaluate [101].
The tendency to disregard probability during decision-making [102].
The tendency to systematically ”underestimat[e] the probability or ex-
tent of expected disruption” during a disaster” [59].
The tendency to be over—optimistic, overestimating favorable and pleas-
ing outcomes [102].
The tendency to remember the first and last few items in a sequence
more than those in the middle [67].
The tendency to reduce many inferential tasks to simple similarity
judgments [36].
The tendency for different people to perceive the same events differently.[95].
The tendency to pay less attention to the semantics of model than to its
syntax or structural constrains (especially when they conflict) [103].
Unthinking rejection of new information that contradicts established
beliefs or paradigms [104].
The tendency to irrationally prefer, maintain and defend current condi-
tions, operating procedures, status, or social order [105].
Sunk cost bias is the tendency to invest more future resources in a
situation in which a prior investment has been made, compared to a
similar situation in which a prior investment has not been made [66].
TiIne-based bias involves a reduction of attention via short—term think-
ing and hyperbolic discounting errors [106], [107].
The tendency to give undue weight to the degree to which an outcome
is considered as positive or negative when estimating the probability of
its occurrence [108].
”The validity effect occurs when the mere repetition of information
affects the perceived truthfulness of that information, and appears to
be based on recognition memory and may be an automatic process. The
validity effect occurs similarly for statements of fact that are true and
false in origin, as well as political or opinion statemen ” [109, p. 211].
The tendency to underestimate the likelihood of a negative outcome and
vice versa [40].
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